Jonathan Dancy thinks that there are irreducibly normative properties. Frank Jackson has given a well-known argument against this view, and I have elsewhere defended this argument against many objections, including one made by Dancy. But Dancy remains unconvinced. In this chapter, I hope to convince him.
properties.
It may seem easy to show that there are no such properties. Suppose that, at time t, Fred is thinking about the normative property of rightness. In that case, we can denote the normative property of rightness with the descriptive phrase 'the property that Fred is thinking about at time t ', 7 which means that we can ascribe the normative property of rightness with the descriptive predicate 'has the property that Fred is thinking about at time t'. But this does not show that there are no irreducibly normative properties. It merely shows that we should revise our claim about descriptive properties, and say that A property is descriptive if and only if it can be ascribed with a descriptive predicate that does not contain a descriptive phrase that denotes a normative property without ascribing this property. 8 We should revise our claim about normative properties in a similar way. In what follows, I
shall ignore these revisions, since they do not affect my arguments.
Jackson's argument
Inspired by a more general argument that was first given by Jaegwon Kim, Frank Jackson has given the following argument to show that there are no irreducibly normative properties. 8 I say 'without ascribing this property' because a phrase like 'the property that Fred is thinking about at time t' denotes a property without ascribing it, whereas phrases like 'is yellow' or 'is right' both ascribe and denote a property. 9 See Jackson 1998 , pp. 122-3, Jackson 2001 , and also Jackson and Pettit 1996, pp. 84-5 .
For Kim's more general argument, see Kim 1993, pp. 68-71, 149-55 . For discussion of Jackson's argument, see van Roojen 1996 , Williamson 2001 , Shafer-Landau 2003 , pp. 89-98, McNaughton and Rawling 2003 , Dancy 2004a , Majors 2005 , FitzPatrick 2008 , pp. 198-201, Streumer 2008 , Kramer 2009 , pp. 207-12, Plantinga 2010 , Suikkanen 2010 , Brown 2011 , and Enoch 2011 right. Since anything that has normative properties also has descriptive properties, A 1 also has descriptive properties, which we can call P A1-1 , P A1-2 . . . . And the objects O 1 , O 2 , . . . that are part of the same possible world as A 1 have descriptive properties as well, which for each object O x we can call P Ox-1 , P Ox-2 , . . . . 10 Action A 1 therefore satisfies the following predicate, which we can call predicate D 1 :
'has descriptive properties P A1-1 , P A1-2 , . . . and is such that O 1 has descriptive properties P O1-1 , P O1-2 , . . . , O 2 has descriptive properties P O2-1 , P O2-2 , . . . , . . .'.
Since a predicate that wholly consists of descriptive predicates is itself descriptive, predicate D 1 is a descriptive predicate. As before, since a predicate that wholly consists of descriptive predicates is itself descriptive, predicate D* is a descriptive predicate. Now consider the following claim about supervenience:
(S) For all possible worlds W and W*, if the distribution of descriptive properties pp. 137-40. My presentation of the argument in what follows assumes that the number of objects, properties and actions in all possible worlds is countably infinite, but I take this to be merely a matter of presentation. 10 I use the term 'object' to cover anything that has properties, including actions. Objects are part of the same possible world as A 1 if and only if they are actual in the possible world in which A 1 is performed. 11 I assume for simplicity that only actions can be right.
in W and W* is exactly the same, then the distribution of normative properties in W and W* is also exactly the same.
12
If this claim is true, any object that satisfies predicate D* also satisfies the predicate 'is right'.
For otherwise there would be two possible worlds W and W* that have exactly the same distribution of descriptive properties but that do not have the same distribution of normative properties, which would contradict (S). And any object that satisfies the predicate 'is right' also satisfies predicate D*. For objects A 1 , A 2 , . . . are all the right objects there are in all possible worlds, and these objects satisfy the predicates D 1 , D 2 , . . . , which means that they satisfy predicate D*.
This shows that the predicate 'is right' and predicate D* are necessarily coextensive. have elsewhere defended the argument against all of these these objections. In sections 4 and 7, I shall return to two of them. But I shall first discuss a new objection.
Two new versions of the argument
This objection has been made by Campbell Brown. Though Brown accepts the conclusion of Jackson's argument, he suspects that we cannot formulate predicate D* in English, since
English does not seem to contain enough terms to name every object and property in every possible world. 14 In my earlier defence of the argument, I suggested that we can avoid this problem by formulating predicate D* in a language that combines English with a 'Lagadonian' language in which all objects and properties that are not named by English are 13 For some of these objections, see Shafer-Landau 2003 , pp. 90-92, Majors 2005 , and Dancy 2004a and 2004b 14 See Brown 2011. More specifically, Brown claims that English may not be descriptively complete, where a language is descriptively complete if "for any pair of worlds that are descriptively different, there is at least one descriptive sentence (of English) that is true in one world but not the other", and that English may not contain maximally specific sentences, where a sentence ψ is maximally specific if "for any descriptive sentence χ, ψ entails either χ or its negation, ~χ, but not both" (Brown 2011, p. 207-8 Necessarily, a consideration is a reason for action if and only if it increases the probability that this action will maximise preference satisfaction.
Necessarily, a consideration is a reason for a belief if and only if it increases the probability that this belief is true.
Necessarily, a state of affairs is good to the extent that it contains satisfied preferences.
. . . and so on. properties, their different fundamental normative truths would make it the case that they had different distributions of normative properties, which would contradict (S). Different possible worlds could therefore only have different fundamental normative truths if they had different distributions of descriptive properties. But then these different normative truths would not seems to me more secure than the premises of his argument (see Streumer 2008, pp. 546-7 note 20) . 20 As Enoch 2011, p. 146 note 32, puts it: to reach these fundamental normative truths (or, as he calls them, "basic norms"), we "backtrack, so to speak, practical syllogisms to their major premises, until we reach such a major premise that is not itself the conclusion of a practical syllogism, or that is (roughly speaking) free of empirical content". 21 Many non-reductive realists seem to agree that fundamental normative truths are necessary truths (see, for example, McNaughton and Rawling 2003 , p. 33, Parfit 2011a , p. 129, and 2011b , pp. 307, 489-90, 747, and, more tentatively, Enoch 2011 Since triangles have both three sides and three angles, one popular counterexample to (N) is that
The predicates 'has three angles' and 'has three sides' are necessarily coextensive but ascribe different properties.
Though these predicates clearly ascribe different properties, they are not necessarily coextensive, since an open figure can have three sides but only two angles. The example should therefore be revised to:
The predicates 'is a closed figure that has three sides' and 'is a closed figure that has three angles' are necessarily coextensive but ascribe different properties.
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But these predicates, I think, both ascribe the property of being a figure with the following 24 Of course, it does not show that (N) is compatible with the view that properties are meanings of predicates. But the debate between reductive and non-reductive realists is not about whether sentences that contain normative predicates have the same meaning as certain sentences that only contain descriptive predicates, but about whether sentences that contain normative predicates have the same truthmakers as certain sentences that only contain descriptive predicates. Both sides in this debate therefore take properties to be real features of objects rather than meanings of predicates. 25 Kramer 2009, pp. 210-11, claims that the predicates 'has three sides' and 'has three angles' are necessarily coextensive but ascribe different properties when the class of things over which they range is implicitly narrowed to closed figures. However, if this class is implicitly narrowed in this way, it must be possible to make this narrowing explicit by reformulating these predicates as 'is a closed figure that has three sides' and 'is a closed figure that has three angles', which Kramer agrees ascribe the same property. This suggests that if this class is implicitly narrowed in this way, the predicates 'has three sides' and 'has three angles' do ascribe the same property. Of course, if this class is not implicitly narrowed in this way, these predicates ascribe different properties. But in that case, as I argued in Streumer 2008 and as Kramer agrees, these predicates are not necessarily coextensive.
kind of shape:
For figures with this kind of shape also satisfy the predicate 'is a triangle'. And if the predicates 'is a closed figure that has three sides' and 'is a closed figure that has three angles' ascribed two different properties, why would the predicate 'is a triangle' not ascribe yet another different property? If we take properties to be real features of objects, these predicates clearly do not ascribe three different properties. But then the predicates 'is a closed figure that has three sides' and 'is a closed figure that has three angles' do not ascribe two different properties either.
Non-reductive realists may reply that the predicates 'is a closed figure that has three sides' and 'is a closed figures that has three angles' ascribe different properties because these properties consist of different parts: one consists of being a closed figure and having three sides, they may say, and the other consists of being a closed figure and having three angles.
But this overlooks the fact that these predicates could both ascribe a single property that consists of the same three parts: being a closed figure, having three sides, and having three angles. Non-reductive realists who deny this seem to assume that we can read off the composition of a property from the composition of a predicate that ascribes it. If we could do this, the predicates 'is a closed figure that has three sides', 'is a closed figure that has three angles' and 'is a triangle' would again ascribe three different properties.
Non-reductive realists may also say that the predicates 'is a closed figure that has three angles' and 'is a triangle' ascribe the same property because these predicates are synonymous. 26 But suppose that we introduced a new predicate 'is a r', not by defining it but by pointing to a series of figures with the kind of shape that makes them satisfy the predicates 'is a closed figure that has three sides', 'is a closed figure that has three angles'
26 As Enoch 2011 writes, "perhaps it makes sense to think of the property of being a triangle as identical by definition to one of the other two (say, that of having three angles), and then we only have here two properties after all" (p. 139, note 13).
synonymous with any of these other predicates, or it is synonymous with all of them.
Suppose that it is not synonymous with any of the other predicates. In that case, if necessarily coextensive predicates that are not synonymous ascribe different properties, the predicate 'is a r' does not ascribe the same property as the predicate 'is a triangle', which is clearly false.
Suppose next that the predicate 'is a r' is synonymous with all of these other predicates. In that case, if necessarily coextensive predicates that are synonymous ascribe the same property, these four predicates all ascribe the same property, which supports rather than undermines (N). I therefore think that this counterexample fails.
Another popular counterexample to (N) is that
For any X, the predicates 'is X' and 'is X and is such that Socrates is identical to
Socrates' are necessarily coextensive but ascribe different properties.
If we take properties to be real features of objects, however, the predicate 'is such that
Socrates is identical to Socrates' does not ascribe a property. For being such that something else is identical to itself is clearly not a real feature of an object. This means that adding the phrase '. . . and is such that Socrates is identical to Socrates' to the predicate 'is X' does not affect which property this predicate ascribes. It therefore means that the predicates 'is X' and 'is X and is such that Socrates is identical to Socrates' ascribe the same property.
Non-reductive realists may reply that if the predicate 'is such that Socrates is identical to Socrates' does not ascribe a property, neither does the predicate 'is such that O 1 has descriptive properties P O1-1 , P O1-2 , . . . , O 2 has descriptive properties P O2-1 , P O2-2 , . . .', which is part of predicate D*. But Jackson's argument does not require that the predicate 'is such that O 1 has descriptive properties P O1-1 , P O1-2 , . . . , O 2 has descriptive properties P O2-1 , P O2-2 , .
. .' by itself ascribes a property. All that needs to be true is that predicate D* as a whole ascribes a property. And the mere fact that a predicate that is part of a larger predicate does not by itself ascribe a property does not make it the case that this larger predicate as a whole does not ascribe a property, as is shown by the fact that the predicates 'is X' and 'is X and is such that Socrates is identical to Socrates' ascribe the same property. Moreover, the other two versions of Jackson's argument that I have presented do not rely on predicate D*. I therefore think that this counterexample fails too.
A third counterexample to (N), which has been given by Derek Parfit, is that
The predicates 'is the only even prime number' and 'is the positive square root of four' are necessarily coextensive but ascribe different properties.
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The sentence "Two is the positive square root of four" does not ascribe a property to the number two, however, but instead says that the number two is identical to the positive square root of four. For we can reformulate this sentence as "The positive square root of four is two", and we would normally formalise it as " 4 2 = ". Moreover, suppose that this sentence did ascribe a property to the number two. Since Parfit admits that the phrases 'the positive square root of four' and 'the only even prime number' both refer the number two, it is hard to see how he can deny that the predicate 'is the positive square root of four' ascribes the same property as the predicate 'is the only even prime number': namely, the property of being the number two. I therefore think that this counterexample fails as well.
A fourth and final counterexample to (N), which has been given by Alvin Plantinga, Non-reductive realists could say that merely showing that some counterexamples to (N) fail does not show that all counterexamples fail. But I think that at least one of the following claims will be true of any apparent counterexample to (N):
(1) There is a further predicate that is also necessarily coextensive with the predicates in the example but that clearly does not ascribe a further property.
(2) A phrase that is part of one of the predicates in the example does not affect which property this predicate ascribes. (3) One of the phrases in the example does not ascribe a property, but is instead part of an identity statement.
(4) The example relies on a criterion of property identity that we should reject if we take properties to be real features of objects.
If that is so, the replies I have just given do show that all apparent counterexamples to (N) fail. And if these replies show this, they show both that (N) is true and that (N) is compatible with a wide range of views about properties. 
Can non-reductive realists appeal to Leibniz's law?
Non-reductive realists may now admit that (N) is true of descriptive properties, but deny that it is true of normative properties. They can only plausibly do this, however, if they can explain why (N) is not true of normative properties, in a way that is compatible with its being true of all other properties. I shall now discuss two new objections to Jackson's argument that can be seen as attempts to explain this.
The first objection, which makes use of Dancy's views, has been put forward by Jussi
Suikkanen. Suikkanen thinks that non-reductive realists can explain why (N) is not true of normative properties by appealing to a version of
Leibniz's law: If there is a higher-order property that property p 1 has but property p 2 31 Suikkanen 2010, p. 92, says that this defence of (N) leads to a "stalemate", with both sides "happy with their intuitions", and Enoch 2011, p. 139, similarly says that it leads to an "impasse". But if non-reductive realists want to say that the predicates 'is a closed figure that has three sides' and 'is a closed figure that has three angles' ascribe two different properties, as Suikkanen and Enoch apparently want to do, they will have to explain why this is so, in a way that does not entail that the predicates 'is a triangle' and 'is a r' ascribe a third and a fourth property. Enoch suggests that they can explain this by appealing to a general principle of parsimony (p. 139, note 13). But if so, why does this principle not also show that the predicates 'is a closed figure that has three sides' and 'is a closed figure that has three angles' ascribe the same property?
lacks, then p 1 and p 2 are not identical.
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As Suikkanen notes, Dancy and other non-reductive realists endorse the following claims:
(1) Our knowledge that an action is right is normally a priori, but our knowledge that an action has the property that is ascribed by predicate D* is normally a posteriori.
(2) Dancy 1993 Dancy , pp. 73-77, 2004b Dancy , pp. 85-6, and 2005 128. For Dancy's claims about the practical relevance of normative facts, see Dancy 2005, pp. 136-7 (I call this relevance 'intrinsic' because Dancy thinks that the practical relevance of normative facts is not a further fact about these facts). Suikkanen also considers two other higher-order properties that the property of being right may be said to have but the property that is ascribed by predicate D* may be said to lack: being supervenient and having a unified 'shape'. But he rightly doubts that non-reductive realists can appeal to these properties to reject reductive realism.
that normative properties have the higher-order properties that (1), (2) and (3) And they can then say that
(1*) Our knowledge that an action is right is normally a priori if this property is presented under the normative mode, but normally a posteriori if it is presented under the descriptive mode.
(2*) The property of being right is resultant, but this is normally only clear to us if this property is presented under the normative mode.
(3*) The fact that an object has the property of being right has intrinsic practical relevance, but this is normally only clear to us if this property is presented under the normative mode.
If these claims are true, the property of being right and the descriptive property that is ascribed by predicate D* do not have different higher-order properties. If so, it does not follow from Leibniz's Law that these properties are not identical.
This shows that if non-reductive realists want to appeal to Leibniz's Law to explain why (N) is not true of normative properties, they will need to explain why we should accept
(1), (2) and (3) rather than (1*), (2*) and (3*). One difference between these sets of claims is that whereas (1), (2) and (3) presuppose that the property of being right is not identical to the property that is ascribed by predicate D*, (1*), (2*) and (3*) presuppose that these properties are identical. But non-reductive realists cannot appeal to this difference to explain why we should accept (1), (2) and (3). For their explanation of why we should accept (1), (2) and (3) would then presuppose that (N) is not true of normative properties. And if their explanation of why we should accept (1), (2) and (3) presupposed this, they could not go on to appeal to (1), (2) and (3) to explain why (N) is not true of normative properties.
There are three other differences between these sets of claims that non-reductive realists could appeal to in order to explain why we should accept (1), (2) and (3). One is that
(1*), (2*) and (3*) make assumptions about modes of presentation that are not made by (1), (2) and (3). But given that I have defined the normative and descriptive modes of presentation in terms of normative and descriptive predicates, these assumptions are very plausible. And non-reductive realists can only appeal to this difference between these sets of claims to explain why we should accept (1), (2) and (3) if they can show that these assumptions are implausible.
A second difference is that whereas (1*), (2*) and (3*) say that the property that is ascribed by predicate D* has the same higher-order properties as the property that is ascribed by the predicate 'is right', (1), (2) and (3) deny this. But it is hard to see how non-reductive realists can show that the property that is ascribed by predicate D* does not have these higher-order properties, other than by saying that this property is not identical to the property that is ascribed by the predicate 'is right'. As before, if they said this, they could not appeal to this difference to explain why we should accept (1), (2) and (3). For their explanation of why we should accept (1), (2) and (3) would then again presuppose that (N) is not true of normative properties.
A third and final difference is that whereas if (2*) is true resultance is a form of entailment, (2) is compatible with resultance being what Suikkanen calls a "metaphysically robust, worldly making-relation". 34 But it is hard to see how non-reductive realists can show that resultance is such a worldly making-relation, other than by saying that normative properties are not identical to descriptive properties. Once again, if they said this, they could not appeal to this difference to explain why we should accept (1), (2) and (3). For their 34 Suikkanen 2010, p. 102 . See also McNaughton and Rawling 2003, pp. 32-3. explanation of why we should accept (1), (2) and (3) would then again presuppose that (N) is not true of normative properties. I therefore think that Suikkanen's objection fails to explain why (N) is not true of normative properties.
Are irreducibly normative properties indispensible to deliberation?
A second objection to Jackson's argument that be seen as an attempt to explain why (N) is not true of normative properties has been made by David Enoch. (1) and (2) justify the belief that if a property plays an ineliminable role in our best causal explanations, this is a sufficient 37 Enoch 2011 , pp. 50-84, 137-140. 38 Enoch 2011 Enoch 2011, pp. 50-84 . Clearly, whether this argument is sound depends on whether Enoch is right that the principle of explanatory parsimony can only be justified if (1) and (2) justify the belief that a property's playing an ineliminable role in our best causal explanations is a sufficient reason for positing its existence. If this belief can be justified in a different way, or if it does not stand in need of justification, Enoch cannot appeal to the similarity between (1) and (2) on the one hand and (1*) and (2*) on the other to argue that (1*) and (2*) justify the belief that there are irreducibly normative properties, and that we should therefore reject the principle of explanatory parsimony. 40 Enoch 2011, pp. 72-4 . 41 Enoch 2011, pp. 100-109. Enoch admits that reductive realists do not seem to have this intuition, which weakens this argument. 42 I here use the term 'commit' in the sense outlined by Enoch 2011 , p. 74. Enoch 2011 , also suggests that engaging in deliberation commits us to the existence of irreducibly normative properties because the questions we ask in deliberation cannot be answered with purely descriptive claims. But if so, that merely shows that deliberation commits us to the existence of properties that can be ascribed with normative predicates, which does not entail that these properties are irreducibly normative.
think that these properties are not identical to descriptive properties. That is not enough for Enoch's defence of (1*) to succeed.
Moreover, suppose that Enoch's defence of (1*) did succeed. In that case, engaging in our project of deliberating about what to do would commit us to the existence of irreducibly normative properties. But engaging in a different project, such as our project of explaining the world, may similarly commit us to the non-existence of these properties. For the concept of a property that we use in explaining the world may commit us to (N), and may thereby commit us to the claim that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. If that were so, our concept of a normative property would be incoherent. We could then compare it to another concept that some philosophers think is incoherent: our concept of free will. Given that our concept of free will may be incoherent, we should not take the mere fact that engaging in deliberation commits us to the existence to free will to show that we actually have free will. Similarly, given that our concept of a normative property may also be incoherent, we should not take the mere fact that engaging in deliberation commits us to the existence of irreducibly normative properties to show that there actually are such properties. I therefore think that, like Suikkanen's objection, Enoch's objection fails to explain why (N) is not true of normative properties. I conclude that (N) applies to all properties, including normative ones. One is that many non-reductive realists seem, at least to some extent, to conflate properties with the meanings of the predicates that ascribe these properties. For example, Dancy writes that "the naturalist idea has to be that the subject matter of the fact that this action would maximize welfare could be the same as that of the fact that it would make the action right", and that "it just isn't true . . . that the fact that this action maximizes welfare (say) has the same subject matter as the fact that that fact would make the action right".
Why non-reductive realists are unmoved by the argument
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These claims about the 'subject matter' of facts seem to me to conflate facts with meanings of sentences, and thereby seem to conflate properties with meanings of predicates. And Parfit 46 Of course, many facts stand in the relation of being-a-reason-for to more than one action, and many actions are such that there is more than one fact that stands in the relation of being-a-reason-for to them. These facts and these actions are included more than once in F 1 , F 2 , . . . and in A 1 , A 2 , . . . . 47 Dancy 2004b, p. 65, objects to this that the relation of being-a-reason-for (or, as he calls it, the 'favouring relation') is necessarily asymmetrical, whereas the relation ascribed by predicate R* is not. I reply to this objection in Streumer 2008, p. 556 . 48 Dancy 2005, p. 140. writes that the phrases 'is the only even prime number' and 'is the positive square root of four' ascribe different properties because " [b] eing the only even prime number cannot be the same as being -or be what it is to be -the positive square root of 4". 49 This use of 'what it is to be' also seems to me to conflate properties with meanings of predicates.
A second reason why non-reductive realists remain unmoved may be that they think that Jackson's argument is meant to show that reductive realism is true. Jackson does sometimes give the impression that he takes the argument to show this. In fact, however, the argument only shows that there are no irreducibly normative properties. In other words, it only shows that If there are normative properties, these properties are identical to descriptive
This conclusion is compatible with the falsity of reductive realism, since it is compatible with the claim that
If there are normative properties, these properties are not identical to descriptive
The implausibility of reductive realism therefore need not stop Dancy and other nonreductive realists from accepting the conclusion of Jackson's argument.
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A third and final reason why non-reductive realists remain unmoved may be that they think that the most defensible alternative to non-reductive realism is an error theory according to which normative judgements ascribe non-existent properties, which is a view they cannot bring themselves to believe. 51 I agree that such an error theory is the most 49 Parfit 2011, p. 297. 50 I defend the claim that normative properties are not identical to descriptive properties in Streumer 2011. 51 For the view that an error theory is the most plausible alternative to non-reductive realism, see, for example, Enoch 2011, p. 115. defensible alternative to non-reductive realism. But I do not believe this theory myself, and I do not think that anyone else should believe it either. For I have argued elsewhere that we cannot believe this error theory, and that there is therefore no reason for us to believe it. 52 If that is so, non-reductive realists' inability to believe such an error theory should not stop them from accepting the conclusion of Jackson's argument either.
Conclusion
I have presented three versions of Jackson's argument against the existence of irreducibly normative properties, and I have argued that two existing objections and three new objections to the argument fail. I conclude, as before, that the argument shows that there are no irreducibly normative properties. I realise that Dancy may still not be convinced. But I hope he will at least agree that non-reductive realists have not yet come up with a wholly adequate response to the argument. 
